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1 Introduction: The photographic message 
“I’ve seen things you people wouldn't believe. Attack ships on fire off the shoulder of 
Orion. I watched C-beams glitter in the dark near the Tannhäuser Gate. All those 
moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. Time to die.” (Replicant Roy Batty’s Tears 
in the rain monologue, in Ridley Scott’s, Blade Runner, 1982) 
 
Before its electrical support system was switched off for the last time at 
09:00 Universal Coordinated Time on 27 July 2014, the Philae lander sent 
several photographs from its landing site on the face of the comet 
67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko to Earth. And while Philae’s scientific mission 
was cut short when its solar panels failed to recharge, the images that reached 
planet Earth are immediately recognisable as snapshots.  They are rectangular, 
black and white, lacking detail in shadows and highlights (one of two extra f-
stops would not go amiss) and carelessly composed to include Philae’s own feet 
in the foreground. Gazing into these likenesses one experiences a mixture of 
wonder and tedious familiarity: Who knew that a rock is a rock, a shadow is a 
shadow and perspective works just the same whether you are on the face of a 
comet or in your own back yard. Here and there photography erases all 
differences in scale and location in favour of representations designed to be 
viewed by a human eye. The near and the distant, the micro and the macro are 
rendered by the photographic camera all the same. The photographic treatment 
consists of producing representations of whatever happens to be in-front of the 
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lens, reflecting the whole world as if in a mirror, bestowing a comforting 
uniformity on everything that appears in its field of view. Even a picture of a 
comet 300 million miles away confirms to the familiar logical construct of a 
model represented in a copy. No matter how remote or alien the model is, 
photography can be trusted to show it to us as familiar, and we can be trusted in 
turn to interpret the photograph as relating to our own sense of a temporal and 
spatial reality. We do this by projecting onto the photograph our experience of 
time as chronological and linear, and of space as continuous, three dimensional 
and populated by distinct objects.  
 
Figure 1: Photograph: CIVA/Philae/Rosetta/ESA 
The common denominator of the astonishing variety of pictures that are 
delivered daily to our desktops, laptops and smartphones is the photographic 
apparatus that is specifically designed to produce pictures that humans can 
comprehend. All these images have one, and only one subject: us, the onlookers 
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for whom photography toils day and night, in producing images for the 
consumption by the human eye.1  
The message of photography is not only that comets look a bit like 
roadworks, but also that human vision is the universal and homogeneous mode of 
access to reality in all its forms. Almost 500 years since Copernicus declared that 
the Sun rather than the Earth is the centre of the universe, we are still welded to 
the world view that sees us, the human species, as the Sun that is holding 
together all that there is in the world. The message of photography is that we, the 
humans are species apart, because we possess the rational view of the world, we 
own the vantage point from which everything can be observed as a reflection, a 
copy and a representation.  
The photographic treatment of reality is dovetailed with the belief in the 
binary opposition of model and copy, underpinned by the dialectics of subject 
and object, that posits a universal subjectivity as a cornerstone of human-centric 
world view. In particular, this view asserts that the thing represented is 
completely distinct and independent from the mechanism of representation.2 And 
even as we are now entering the age of the Anthropocene, in which the extinction 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1 On the construction of a different photographic apparatus that does not succumb to the rhetoric 
of single point of view and perspectival geometry, see: Azoulay, Aïm Deüelle Lüski and 
Horizontal Photography. 
2 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning, 46. 
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by humans of other species expands to the self-extinction of humanity, our faith 
in the dualisms enshrined by photographic representation remains unperturbed.3  
It is the am in this essay to outline another photography, that is more suited 
to the tasks of our time then the humanist, representational approach. I name this 
photography posthuman not only to distinguish it from the previous epoch, but 
also to underscore its rejection of the model-copy paradigm, and the subjective 
modes engendered by it. Posthuman photography is concerned with the 
photographic image that is based not on the patriarchal politics of identity and 
subject-object dualisms but on establishing the mulitiversal: a rhizomatic 
assemblage of interconnected fragments [0] + [1] repetition, that when taken 
together form a picture of what it means ‘to be’ in the digital age4. Posthuman 
photography is not asking what things in the world look like, but what it means 
to live in the world of interconnected and networked entities that create 
meaningful objects without recourse to the universal values ‘god’, ‘absolute’, 
‘index’, signifier’ and ‘sign’.  
 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
3 Colebrook, "Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1." 
4 Golding, Johnny. 2014 “Ecce Homo Sexual; Ontology and eros in the age of incompleteness 
and entanglement”. Parallax 20 (3) 217-230. See also: Golding, Johnny. 2010. “Fractal 
philosophy, trembling a plane of immanence and the small matter of learning how to listen: 
Attunement as the task of art. In Deleuze and Contemporary Art.” 
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2 The rhizome, the frame 
Is it possible to speak of photography from any perspective other than the 
representational? Yes, of course it is. Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of the 
rhizome allows us to think of photography as a multiple, proliferating structure 
that reproduces itself through exponential multiplication, simultaneously 
engaging in visual, economic, social and political production. 
Let us summarize the principal characteristics of a rhizome: unlike 
trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other 
point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same 
nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even 
nonsign states. The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the 
multiple. It is not the One that becomes Two or even directly three, 
four, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived from the One, or to which 
One is added (n + 1). It is composed not of units but of dimensions, 
or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but 
always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it 
overspills. It constitutes linear multiplicities with n dimensions 
having neither subject nor object, which can be laid out on a plane 
of consistency, and from which the One is always subtracted (n- 1). 
When a multiplicity of this kind changes dimension, it necessarily 
changes in nature as well, undergoes a metamorphosis. Unlike a 
structure, which is defined by a set of points and positions, with 
binary relations between the points and biunivocal relationships 
between the positions, the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of 
segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of 
fight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which 
the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature. These 
lines, or lineaments, should not be confused with lineages of the 
arborescent type, which are merely localizable linkages between 
points and positions. […] In contrast to centered (even polycentric) 
systems with hierarchical modes of communication and 
preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, 
nonsignifying system without a General and without an organizing 
memory or central automaton, defined solely by a circulation of 
states. What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality-
 6 
but also to the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, 
things natural and artificial-that is totally different from the 
arborescent relation: all manner of "becomings."5 
A rhizomatic approach to photography does not begin from a distinction 
between model and copy or subject and object, instead it makes connections 
between various points across temporary proliferating arrangements, branching 
out, creating networks, always multiplying and sprouting in new directions. 
Conceived as a rhizome, a photograph is understood as connected to other 
photographs, as well as to objects, entities, processes and organisms, forming a 
network that continually evolves through expansions and contractions. A 
rhizomatic understanding of photography takes account of the fact that meaning 
and knowledge are not derived from representing but from connections between 
bodies and their direct material engagements with the world.  
Representation of pre-existing reality is not the be-all and end-all of 
photography. As Foucault have observed, space itself has a history 6. The unified, 
ordered, geometrical space of the photograph belongs squarely with the 
conception of space as measurable and calculable, in which every point is 
identical to every other point. This rational, perspectival space was invented by 
scientists, artists and philosophers of the Enlightenment, who attempted to 
produce a logical picture of the world. Photography however, stands on a 
threshold of a new era, populated not by representations, but by networks, webs 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
5 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 21. 
6 Foucault, The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. Vol. 2, Aesthetics, 175-6. 
 7 
and grids, and defined not by the subjectivity of the observer but by the 
relationships between interconnected points and entities that have no fixed and 
stable identities, but produce meaning by association, through dissemination, 
processing and sharing via online systems. In what follows I will show that in the 
age of post-truth and fake news, photography does not cease to make pictures, 
but confronts the eye with images that emerge at the limits of representation, 
questioning the supremacy of human vision, and questioning the claims of 
representationalism for objectivity and realism.     
One side of photography is no doubt representational and signifying but to 
say that photography is only this, is not only to legitimise forms of mastery and 
domination contained with the ‘master-copy’ paradigm, but also to overlook the 
material processes of reproduction, copying, distribution and dissemination that 
operate within and around the image. No semiotic analysis can grasp what is 
going on at the moment of looking, because nothing in this situation can be 
reduced to stable, meaningful signs.  
The photograph is situated at cross-roads between complex systems, each 
one of which has its own specific parameters and its own consistency. A 
photograph simultaneously interlaces several layers of (co)existence: 1) rational 
world view based on mathematical foundations. 2) technical know-how capable 
of translating this world view into material objects. 3) Economic systems capable 
of producing and distributing these objects. 4) collective imagination and desire 
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for the consumption of these objects. 5) Political agendas that release the capital 
required for the distribution and public consumption.7 However, the 
amalgamation of these forces is far from harmonious or seamless: desires, 
politics, economics and reason are at war with each other and the photograph is 
not the setting of their happy union but the site of the hand-to-hand combat of 
energies that are barely contained within its rectangular frame.8  
 
Figure 2. Mont Blanc observatory deck, France, Marco Bohr 2006 
The image in figure 2 is not only a recording of a scene, but also an 
assertion of a centering and selective gaze that legitimises certain viewing and 
political practices that cohere around the demand for objectivity, rigidity and 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
7 Guattari, Félix. 1995. Chaosmosis: An Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm Trans. Paul Bains and Julian 
Pefanis. Indiana University Press. Pp 47-48. 
8 On ‘hand to hand combat of energies’ see Massumi, A User's Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, 146.  
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hegemony.9 To say the same thing slightly differently, the correspondence 
between a photograph and the world is depending on the presumption of the 
subjectivity of the observer on the one hand, and the objectivity of the ‘out there’ 
on the other. This presumption is sustained by means of ignoring all those 
aspects of the picture that do not fit within this representational schema. Our very 
insistence to see photographs as representations of past events has consequences 
to the way we see ourselves as passive onlookers for whom the world is a 
spectacle. To illustrate the way photography produces specific forms of 
subjectivity, where technical, optical, economic, and political mechanisms play a 
dominant role, consider what happens to me during the act of looking at a 
photograph. We can recall here Felix Guatari’s analysis of looking at a TV 
screen10. When I look at a photograph I exist at an intersection: 1. I am fascinated 
by the content of the image, whether shocking, entertaining or arousing. 2. I am 
associating the spatial-motor-temporal dimensions of my world to the 
photograph, recognising it as situated in a specific chronological and 
geographical relation to myself. 3. I am also at the same time daydreaming, 
fantasising or thinking in ways that are only partially (if at all) triggered by the 
event of looking a photograph. And finally 4. I am already anticipating the next 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
9 ‘conceptualisation does not simply create hierarchies of thought; rather it serves to legitimate of 
justify certain visual, linguistic, social, and political practices that developed around the demand 
for intelligibility, rigidity, and hegemony.’  Olkowski, Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of 
Representation, 25 
10 Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm, 16. 
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image, that will reveal itself after a click, a swipe or a tap on the screen. How can 
there be a cohesion between these fragments that pull me in different directions?  
The frame is a constant reminder that the photograph struggles to maintain 
an equilibrium between its claim for realism and the obvious fact that it is 
detached from the real. The photograph endeavours to depict continuity and 
homogeneity, but these fragile qualities can only be sustained for the price of 
ignoring an obvious truth: a photograph looks nothing like the reality it purports 
to represent. For one thing, reality is not contained within a frame, it has no 
border, no limit, no edge. For that reason, the edge of the photograph must be 
summarily ignored in order to maintain the illusion of similarity between the 
photograph and the world. The edge of the photograph simply drops out of any 
and all discussions of photography, nobody seems to ask what part of the real the 
edge corresponds with. But perhaps these questions must be asked: who and for 
what reasons decided that the edge is not important and must be ignored? Why 
and when was it established that the edge is less important than the middle? And 
finally, what can the edge of the photograph reveal about the geometrical optics 
of representation and the construction of identity engendered by it? 
Shifting the attention from the content of the image to the edge that 
encloses it is a strategic move that disregards the common-sense notion of what a 
photograph is for. The usual view that sees the photograph as a representation is 
based in the fantasy of an authentic present, from which we look back at a fixed 
and immobile past. As Karen Barad has shown, the activity of boundary making 
is an essential attribute of anthropocentric, representationalist tendencies, 
because representationalist attitude is founded on the premise that images 
mediate between the known and the knower.  
 11 
Refusing the anthropocentrisims of humanism and antihumanism, 
posthumanism marks the practice of accounting for the boundary-
making practices by which the ‘human’ and its others are 
differentially delineated and defined. 11 
The trust in the power of photography to mirror a pre-existing state of 
affairs is an attribute of a status-quo that believes in the triumph of objectivity 
and reason over the darker, more ambiguous aspects of human nature.  
Drawing on the figure of the philosopher-king as the upholder of universal 
values, the photographer-king provides a model of rational human conduct by 
being attached to a universal system of image-making and the universally 
applicable logic of reflection, in which subjectivity is seen as the privileged 
means of relating to the world. The rationality of the photographic procedure is 
connected with the idea of subjectivity as a real-life practice of relating to the 
world through images on the one hand, and on the other with the overarching 
metaphor of photography as reflection: the image is always conceived as a 
reflection of something that is external to it. Straight away we are justified in 
registering a concern, a grievance even, for is it not the case that reflection 
presupposes the existence of original (the one being reflected) and copy (the 
reflection), and with them the notion that former is more genuine then the later, 
has greater rights to call itself ‘authentic’ and generally lord it over the lesser 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
11 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning, 136., see also the talk by Professor Karen Barad with the title: "Troubling Time/s, 
Undoing the Future." At: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBnOJioYNHU, accessed January 
15, 2017 
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entity that is relegated to the position of a copy, a replica or a clone12. According 
to the logic of reflection, the world is populated by clones that bear visual 
resemblance to ‘originals’ but have none of the vital characteristics of authentic 
beings. Understood as a reflection photography is not only a visual regime but 
also an ideology that believes in the notions of authenticity and originality, as 
well as in the subordination of the copy to the model. Reflection-photography 
does not only provide us with images of the world, it also shapes our thinking 
about the world by emphasizing hierarchical structures and modes of 
subjectivisation that are engendered in the idea of reflection as a visual 
methodology.   
Simply put, the whole point of reality surely must be that it cannot be 
contained in a frame, and equally, that anything framed has already lost touch 
with the real. Photographic practice is taking for granted the notion that the real 
can be diced and sliced, packaged in neat little rectangles, that are supposed to 
contain a grain of truth about the world that is out-there. Notice that here we are 
already dealing with two assumptions, two separate levels of truth: 1. The world 
is true, and 2. The picture of the world is also true.  
Representation takes this separation between the image and the world as 
foundational, it divides the real into things on the one hand, and images on the 
other, and maintains that they are fully distinct from each other.13 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
12 Haraway, Dona J. 199 
13 Colebrook, Claire. 1999 
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Representational approach to photography asserts that there are only two kinds of 
entities: there are bodies and there are images. Bodies are entities fixed in space 
and time, while images are not even entities, they are merely clones of objects. 
From this perspective a photograph has truth value because it corresponds to 
something out-there, however, correspondence demands the presence of an 
individual who is qualified to recognise the resemblance between the real and the 
image. For that reason, representation brings with it a conception of nature that is 
objectified and of a subject who is viewing the world through logical and rational 
prism.  
Making a small shift from the centre of the image to its edge, I will discuss 
below another way of looking, that does not involve the bear hug of the master-
copy paradigm. The edge of the image is formed from the same elements that 
make the image, but it also contains the additional sense of a limit, a threshold or 
a cut.  Considered on its own merits, the edge of the photograph is the non-
signifying part of the image, yet it manages to speak of the experience of depth 
that, in the words of Maurice Blanchot ‘does not surrender itself face to face; it 
only reveals itself by concealing itself in the work’14. To show what kind of work 
the edge does, Blanchot recalls the myth of Orpheus who descended to hell to 
bring Eurydice back from the dead. Photography is like Orpheus, tirelessly 
rescuing people, events and situations from disappearing into the darkness, 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
14 Blanchot, Maurice. 1981. The Gaze of Orpheus, and Other Literary Essays. Ed. P Adams 
Sitney. Trans. L Davis Barrytown, N.Y. ; Station Hill Press, p.100 
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preserving in a snapshot the likeness of that which is no more. Like Orpheus, 
photography can only perform this task on the condition that it does not turn 
back to look at the edge out of which the image emerges. The edge is not a sign 
or a symbol but a physical mark in the physical world, yet formed entirely by the 
materials of the image, as such the edge is both material and immaterial, both an 
appearance and a reality.  
The whole Platonic distinction between the model and the copy hinges on 
the complete distinction between the two,15 yet here, within the edge of the 
image, the eye encounters something which is both true and false at the same 
time. This state of undecidability of the edge (is it an image? Is it a thing?) points 
not towards identity between images and things, but towards altogether different 
image economy that does not relate at all to the true / false opposition, instead 
the edge exposes this opposition itself as untrue. In place of an opposition, the 
edge presents us with superpositionality. As Barad explains, superpositions are 
the embodiment of indeterminacy.16 Where is the edge of the image? Where the 
image ends? It is a question that opens the door to an approach to photography 
that is not based on the logic of reflection but on an engagement with images that 
is in equal parts material and semiotic17. The edge of the image has its own 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
15 Plato, “The Republic,” 1124-1125 (504d-505b). See also Jeffery A. Bell, Philosophy at the 
Edge of Chaos. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 69. 
16 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning, p.265 
17 On posthuman / non-human strategies of mediation see: Haraway, Donna. 2016. Tentacular 
thinking: Anthropocene, capitalocene, chrhulucene. E-flux, no. 75:01-17.  
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superpower: one look at it and the picture dissolves and disappears and in its 
place another truth is being revealed, the truth of the other image, produced not 
by the surface of representation, but by its edge.  
The edge of the photograph points to the exact location where 
representation finds its limit, where the content of the image gives way to the 
material conditions of imageness. The edge is the self-referential fragment that 
appears again and again in every photograph, indicating in a simple and 
unambiguous manner that an image is being made. As far as the edge is 
concerned, there is no question of representation, only of the presence of the 
statement 'it is an image'. However, it also gets complicated, because the frame 
implies a content that constitutes the object of the image, a content around which 
the frame frames. Nevertheless, the object has to be suspended for the frame to 
be articulated and come into view. The object does not come before the frame, 
the frame, in that sense does not frame the object but dissolves it. Vision here is 
faced with the almost impossible task of facing the ground zero of vision: the 
limit of visibility. The frame dissolves not only the object but also the dialectics 
of subject and object, form and content.  
When we are committed to establishing a correspondence between a 
photograph and the world, we are prepared to overlook, ignore and blank out the 
edge of the picture for the sake of reassurance in the translatability of the real 
into images. In other words, in our haste to establish an equivalence between the 
photograph and the world we agree to overlook all those attributes that do not 
match, but through which another dimension of the image (and of the world) is 
being made visible.  
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3 The constriction of photographic identity  
By giving every member of society a recognisable and recordable face that could 
be preserved in a family album, stored in a police file and exhibited in a gallery, 
photography acts as a catalyst for the creation of the modern individual as someone 
who spends their life as a passive spectator of flickering images while at the same time 
being exposed to universal procedures of recording and surveillance. The determining 
factor here is that both as a form of mass entertainment and of social control, 
photography is marked by a rational and logical relationship among images and the 
world they allegedly represent. In what follows I will suggest that when the 
engagement with photography is limited to questions of recognition and resemblance, 
such approach stifles our experience of the world and directs us towards monotonous 
homogeneity in which everything can be represented in a photograph, and a 
photograph is always a representation of something or other. And yet, a photograph 
has the potential to move our gaze beyond representation of events and situations in a 
way that allows us to penetrate the appearance of things and to sense their inner truth, 
rather than act as a mere illustration. 
As two brief examples, we might think of the photograph in a passport that is 
used to verify the identity of its owner when the border control (human or facial 
recognition algorithm)  compares the resemblance between the image and the person, 
and then, in a different (but connected) manner, the video recording made by Diamond 
Reynolds of the aftermath of her boyfriend, Philando Castile being shot by police 
officers, which was viewed by millions of people online, and acted as a catalyst to the 
‘Black Lives Matter’ movement. In the first case, the passport photo speaks not only 
about the similarity between the image and the person, but also about a system of 
power and control that attributes a legal status to visual resemblance, and legitimises 
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the passing of judgement that is based on visual appearance. In the second  example 
the cameraphone recording captures the moment when visual appearance gets someone 
killed. Here the video footage frames the car window as a screen within a screen on 
which a situation unfolds that transcends the logic of recognition, in which we see a 
black man bleeding out after being shot by police. Representation here is subjected to a 
violent reality check: this is not a police drama played out on a screen in front of my 
eyes, rather I am witnessing the extent to which the visual (on all its virtual, optical, 
political and racial components) forms the peculiar materiality of the everyday.  
 What is presented to the viewer through the images and the voices that the 
camera captured, is not only a documentation of an event, but also the perception of a 
reality that is bigger and more complex than any representation. Rather than being a 
faithful documentation of something that happened, this footage acquires a certain 
autonomy from the event it recorded, releasing from it a force that is haunting and 
scarring the viewer. While we can never feel what it was like to be in that car during 
that shooting, the jittery recording of the car window that frames the policeman on an 
ubiquitous sidewalk shouting hysterically, combined with the narration by Diamond 
Reynolds, who is talking both to the officer and to us, simultaneously obeying the 
orders to show her hands and reporting her boyfriend’s death and her own arrest, 
suggest that violence, racism and fear are both everyday occurrences in suburban 
America and that they have a specific visual form that this video recording managed to 
capture. 
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Figure 3. Screengrab of livestream video recording made by Diamond Reynolds of the fatal 
shooting of Philando Castille on 6 July 2016. 
 
In both examples discussed above the image acts not only as a rational 
representation of an external reality, and its authority and agency are anchored not only 
in our naive belief in photography’s ability to simply record a world of people, objects 
and events just as it is. Rather, what we are able to glimpse is the autonomy of the 
photographic image (both moving and still), and its ability to expose the power of the 
image qua image to shape and intervene in the world around us. What we are 
witnessing is not a representation of pre-existing reality, but the photograph allows us 
to intuit that the visual image is endowed with unique power, and that the power of 
photography lies not in its ability to represent, but in asserting the materiality of visual 
perception.  
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Figure 4. Photo by Yavuz Alatan/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images 
 
The assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey during the opening of a 
photographic exhibition, captured by the professional photographer who was there to 
document diplomat's visit to the gallery, provides another glimpse into the complex 
network that interlinks political and visual situations. Reality here appears produced by 
photography, rather than being recorded by it. Besides being a visually striking 
recording of a historical event, these images may also be seen as a rhizome, suggesting 
that photography and reality are not two separate and distinct entities. Instead this 
image implies that reality itself is like a photographic collage in which political 
violence operates through images, and the ‘shooting’ of photographs is already a 
violent act. The photograph of the assassination in a photographic gallery appears to 
capture the ability of photography to transform reality. Framed by the photographs on 
the gallery walls, this recording of the moment and the aftermath of a killing suggests 
that politics, violence and philosophy are not clearly separate from the visual field, but 
co-exist within it via complex mesh of intra-connections. Even when we look at this 
image for the first time our experience is framed by other images of violence, some 
real and some fictional. It is filtered through both the collective and the personal 
memories of, for instance, the cinematic iconography of Quintin Tarantino and the 
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execution of a Vet Cong prisoner, and while this image can be seen as a simple 
manifestation of our ability to make records and to document, it is also philosophical 
meditation on the specific power visuality, and its unique ability to shape ethical, 
moral and aesthetic perceptions.  
4 From representation  to materiality 
How might we begin to think about the materiality of photography in a way that 
frees it from a dependence on representation? Consider for instance the slideshow 
REM (2016) by Kenta Cobayashi: the sequence is dominated by a continuous 
movement through an imaginary landscape constructed from parts of photographs, 
liquefied billboards and morphed walls, surrounded by reflective, water-like surface. 
Floating through this world one might think of gliding the canals of Venice, or of 
Ridley Scott’s panning shoots of the post-apocalyptic New York in Blade Runner 
(1982). And yet, in REM every solid composite that first appears to the eye as a 
billboard or a wall of a building is revealed to be nothing more (or less) than a surface: 
the camera pierces each surface in turn, revealing another surface behind it, that – like 
the previous one – appears solid at first, but has no other substance than the data it is 
made of. What this work allows us to experience is that beyond the compositional 
elements of an image lies its material condition of continuous repetition, copy and self-
replication. Jean-Francois Lyotard named this condition ‘The Great Ephemeral Skin’. 
In Libidinal Economy he proposed that the role of the artist is to lay bare the 
mechanisms of representation, to show that if there is anything real about 
representation, it is because there also exists a fully real virtual domain constructed not 
from objects and things, but from intensities, desires and surfaces: 
The representative chamber is an energetic dispositif. To describe it 
 21 
and to follow its functioning, that’s what needs to be done. No need 
to do a critique of metaphysics (or of political economy, which is 
the same thing), since critique presupposes and ceaselessly creates 
this very theatricality; rather be inside and forget it, that’s the 
position of the death drive, describe these foldings and gluings, 
these energetic vections that establish the theatrical cube with its six 
homogenous faces on the unique and heterogeneous surface.18   
 
 
Figure 5. Kenta Cobayashi,  Slideshow 'REM' 4 min 49 sec. 2016 Collaboration with Media Artist 
God Scorpion and a track maker Molphobia 
In REM photography is being revealed not as a ‘representative chamber’, but as 
an infinite movement of surfaces that continuously self-replicate and morph into each 
other. The laws of matter in a three dimensional world do not apply to the great 
ephemeral screen on which images proliferate, as on this screen the logic of Euclidian 
geometry is replaced by the evolving symmetry of fractal geometry. This is not 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
18 Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 3. 
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because photography here is rejecting a reference to reality, but because reality itself is 
understood as photographic and for that reason indefinitely signified, continuously 
recurring, subject to the logic of technology, mass-production and the perpetual 
reformulation of commodities for new markets. 
In its traditional form photography expresses the potential for representation 
located within capitalist organization of society. But when photography is detached 
from its ability to produce representations and considered as a flow of image-data, one 
arrives at another fully real force that springs from photography’s ability to produce 
rhythms and not forms, reproduce and not represent, proliferate and not identify, self-
replicate and not copy. As a process of instantaneous distribution, photography is being 
detached from objects in space as it poses a question about the condition of seeing as 
such. Instead of evaluating images on the basis of their similarity to actual events or 
situations, instead of re-examining their indexical or symbolic content, what is required 
is to inquire after the conditions that make something like an image possible. By 
exploring the rules of engagement that govern the use of images, it might be possible 
to free thought from its dependence on the Platonic opposites of image (eikon) and 
Reality (eidos), and from the binary dualisms that follow from it19. For as long as the 
rule of this binary model persists, it is impossible to escape what Deleuze branded as 
‘the four iron collars of representation: Identity in the concept, opposition in the 
predicate, analogy in judgment and resemblance in perception.’20  
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
19 Plato, "The Republic," 601 b-c. 
20 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 330. 
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Figure 6 Daisuke Yokota, Interception 2009 
 
The work of Daisuke Yokota can be considered in this light, as an attempt to 
draw attention away from representation, to the process that can make a picture 
possible. By working with aspects of image production, Yokota approaches the visual 
via a series of transformations that tend to obscure, obliterate and deface the optical 
surface while simultaneously creating an image that exposes the strategies of image 
making. Yokota’s works could be read as a critique of traditional photography’s anti-
photographic tendencies: by privileging sharpness, clarity and realism photography 
modelled itself on how the human subject wants to see the world, rather than insisting 
on a view of the world that is inherently photographic. The camera lens is not the same 
as a human eye, and the chemical or algorithmic processing is not the same as the 
processing of visual stimuli by human brain. Because the camera is not a human 
prosthetic limb, it can create images that are divorced from the way the world presents 
itself to a human subjectivity. Crucially, photography can show us the world not as it 
appears to a spectator, but as a collection of perceptions of intensity, before they are 
submitted to the logic of representation. To say the same thing slightly differently, it is 
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not me who is making images of the world, rather by encountering the world as an 
image, I become who I am. In the famous opening paragraphs of Matter and Memory, 
Henri Bergson explains:  
Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the 
word, images perceived when my senses are opened to them, 
unperceived when they are closed. All these images act and react 
upon one another in all their elementary parts according to constant 
laws which I call laws of nature, and, as a perfect knowledge of 
these laws would probably allow us to calculate and to foresee what 
will happen in each of these images, the future of the images must 
be contained in their present and will add to them nothing new. Yet 
there is one of them which is distinct from all the others, in that I do 
not know it only from without by perceptions, but from within by 
affections: it is my body.21   
Externally I might see a tree, a dog or a house, but internally all I can sense is 
images and I experience my own body as an image. Photography then is not an 
accidental invention or a random discovery of the technological age, but rather it is 
rooted in the very process that is making human beings out of animals and political 
subjects out of humans. The photograph is giving us an image of the world that is not 
human because it is not constrained to the subjective processes of representation. 
Instead, the photograph interrupts the relationship between us and the world, producing 
familiarity and repetition on the one hand and openness towards new, previously 
unknown forms of experience on the other.  
All this means that photography is not a tool that is making us look further, 
remember better and record everything for posterity, rather, it is a way of experiencing 
reality as layered amalgam of data connected through processes of repetition, self-
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
21 Bergson, Matter and Memory , 17. 
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replication and copy. The power of photography, its enduring fascination and mystery 
is that is allows us to see the world not reduced to the view of the human eye.  
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